Recovering Assets in China for Offshore Telecom Fraud Victims

Authors: Ronghua (Andy) LIAO丨Yafei XIANG丨Yutong CAI

Overview

An increasingly common cross-border telecom fraud scheme has emerged in China in recent years.  The scheme is typically perpetrated by fraudsters who establish a foreign shell company outside mainland China through which they open a non-resident bank account ("NRA account") with a mainland Chinese bank (the "receiving bank").  Using various pretexts, the fraudsters induce foreign enterprises or individuals to instruct their overseas remitting bank to transfer funds into the NRA account.  Once these funds arrive, the fraudsters transfer them into an ordinary foreign-currency account at the receiving bank or another domestic bank, convert the foreign currency into local currency through foreign exchange settlement, and dissipate the funds through layered transactions.

In such cases, the core challenge lies in the speed and complexity of the fund movements and the specificities of Chinese laws and practices, which causing significant obstacles for overseas victims in recovering their losses in such cases.  This article proposes targeted recovery methods at each stage of the fund flow and illustrates how to coordinate administrative supervision with practical legal tools.  It systematically explores the strategies and measures by which victims of international telecom fraud can recover their funds through Chinese legal proceedings.

Cross-border fund flows and underlying legal relationships

Cross-border telecom fraud typically involves a multi-jurisdictional flow of funds that begins with the victim's account at the remitting bank and then to the receiving bank with intermediaries in between, such as correspondent banks.  Upon receipt by the receiving bank, the funds flow to the fraudster's NRA account in mainland China at the receiving bank, which are transferred to a general foreign exchange account with the receiving bank or another financial institution.  After this, the fraudsters convert the funds into local currency and proceed to dissipate the funds.

The involvement of intermediary banks depends on whether the remitting and receiving banks maintain correspondent settlement agreements or mutual accounts.  Typical scenarios include the following.

1.  The receiving bank holds an account at the remitting bank.  Upon the victim's remittance instruction, the remitting bank debits the victim's account and credits the receiving bank's account held at the remitting bank.  The remitting bank then issues a payment advice to the receiving bank, which releases the funds to the fraudster's NRA account.

2.  The remitting bank maintains an account at the receiving bank.  The remitting bank debits the victim's account and authorizes the receiving bank to debit its own account.  The receiving bank subsequently transfers the funds to the fraudster's NRA account.

3.   No direct nostro/vostro account relationship exists between the remitting bank and the receiving bank.  In this case, direct clearing is not possible, and thus an intermediary bank is introduced.  This intermediary bank usually maintains accounts with both the remitting bank (or its correspondent bank) and the receiving bank (or its correspondent bank), thereby acting as a bridge between the remitting and receiving banks.

To execute these transfers, banks rely on international messaging and settlement systems – most notably SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) and clearing systems such as CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System).  As a global financial communications network, SWIFT is primarily responsible for transmitting standardized payment instructions between banks but does not handle the actual transfer of funds.  Payment systems such as CHIPS enable net settlement across multiple banks to process fund transfers.  In cross-border remittances, common SWIFT message types include MT103 (Customer Transfer), MT202 (General Financial Institution Transfer), etc.  An MT103 message typically includes information about the remitter, beneficiary (recipient), instructing bank (originating bank), receiving bank, and intermediary bank (if applicable).

In essence, a remittance is a business operation whereby the remitting bank, acting on the remitter's instructions, delivers funds to the designated recipient through various channels.  Although the entities involved may differ depending on the method, the legal relationships in remittance transactions are relatively clear: all parties in the remittance chain form entrustment relationships.  Specifically, the remitter and the remitting bank establish entrustment relationships for the remittance, as do the remitting bank and the receiving bank.  The recipient and the receiving bank form an agency relationship for fund collection.  If intermediary banks are involved, agency relationships also exist between the remitting bank and the intermediary bank, and between the intermediary bank and the receiving bank for fund processing.

Potential methods of recovery at each stage of the fraud

I.   Before the defrauded funds have been credited to the receiving account

Numerous factors can affect the speed at which a cross-border remittance is credited to the receiving account.  These include whether an intermediary is involved, the nature of the receiving account opened in mainland China, and even whether the remitter is subject to foreign-exchange controls.  As a result, by the time the victims realize they have been defrauded, it is possible that the receiving bank has not yet completed the crediting process.

Under prevailing Chinese doctrine, a depositor and a bank have a debtor-creditor relationship, i.e., the depositor holds only a right of claim against the bank for repayment of principal and interest.  Thereafter any movement of those funds in the remittance process remains a modification of that underlying claim.  A cross-border remittance is an "indicative delivery": the remitter creates a new right of claim in favor of the beneficiary against the receiving bank.  Accordingly, so long as the fraudulent funds have not yet been credited, the beneficiary does not yet hold a right to claim against the receiving bank.

As noted above, there exists an entrustment relationship between the remitting bank and the receiving bank with respect to any funds that have been remitted but not yet settled or credited.  This means that the remitter and the remitting bank have not yet performed their respective duties and that the beneficiary has not yet acquired a right of claim against the receiving bank.  In such cases, victims may consider the following measures to recover their funds.

1.   Promptly issue a request to the receiving bank and report to local law enforcement

When funds have been remitted but not yet credited to the fraudster's account, the receiving bank will typically suspend further processing upon receiving a recall request from the remitting bank.  During this process, presenting a police report helps to demonstrate that the transaction arose from telecom fraud rather than a commercial dispute, thereby resulting in swift cooperation from Chinese banks and the relevant authorities.

As noted earlier, the non-crediting of funds indicates that the remitting bank's entrusted obligations remain incomplete.  The victim's prompt issuance of a recall instruction to the remitting bank essentially constitutes a revocation of the remitting bank's obligation to remit the funds.  Under Chinese law, the remitting bank may notify the receiving bank to assert its right to unilateral termination of the entrustment relationship with the receiving bank under the PRC Civil Code, demanding that the receiving bank return the funds as restitution.

Some Chinese commercial banks have operational guidelines for handling recall requests.  For example, the Agricultural Bank of China Foreign Exchange Remittance Business Operating Procedures stipulate, "[w]hen the receiving bank receives a recall/revocation request from the remitting bank, it shall handle the matter as follows: (1) If the inbound remittance has not been settled: Halt the settlement, deduct relevant fees per the remitting bank's instructions, and return the funds to the remitting bank…"

Thus, under applicable law, the receiving bank may face no legal impediment to refunding the funds to the original remitter in accordance with the remitting bank's instructions, provided that the funds have not yet been credited into the beneficiary's account.  In practice, however, some Chinese domestic receiving banks adopt a cautious stance and, before processing a refund, may require a disclaimer from the remitting bank or supporting documents from competent financial regulatory authorities, public security authorities, or court orders.

2.   Sue the receiving bank to demand a return of funds

Given that the remitting and receiving banks already maintain an entrustment relationship via SWIFT messages, the remitting bank may file suit against the receiving bank in mainland China to insist on a same-route refund.  For instance, in the case (2014) Qing Jin Shang Zhong No.80, the Qingdao Intermediate People's Court of Shandong Province held in its reasoning that: "Before the disputed remittance is settled into the beneficiary's account, the funds do not belong to the beneficiary.  The receiving bank's decision to return the funds upon the remitting bank's instructions – based on their agency relationship – is legally permissible".

The situation becomes more complex if the remitting bank refuses to cooperate and the victim must bring a lawsuit in its own name because no direct entrustment relationship expressly exists between them.  In this context, China's concept of "undisclosed agency" may apply.  Specifically, the victim could argue that the receiving bank, through the SWIFT messages, was aware of the victim's identity when processing the remittance instruction and that the receiving bank should have recognized that the remitting bank acted on the victim's behalf.  Thus, an undisclosed agency relationship is established between the victim and receiving bank, making the agency relationship between the remitting and receiving banks directly binding on the victim and the receiving bank.  Through this undisclosed agency framework, the victim may file a lawsuit against the receiving bank to demand fund recovery, even without privity of contract.

3.   Request the receiving bank to return the funds based on instructions from the authorities

As cross-border telecom fraud constitutes a criminal offense, the most common means of recovery lies within China's criminal procedure framework.  In criminal cases, Chinese courts generally adhere to the principle of "criminal proceedings precede civil", dismissing civil claims (e.g., unjust enrichment) brought by the victim until the related criminal procedures conclude.  Rather, restitution typically occurs during criminal proceedings.  For instance, after the illegal or criminal acts have been judicially adjudged, the public security authorities handling the case may directly return the property to the victims or aggrieved parties, provided that: (1) clear and undisputed ownership of the property is supported by conclusive evidence; (2) such restitution does not harm the lawful interests of other victims, aggrieved parties, or third-party stakeholders; and (3) the return of property does not interfere with the normal progress of ongoing investigations or judicial proceedings.

While Chinese law grants domestic authorities jurisdiction over when recipient accounts are located in China, victims of cross-border telecom fraud matters are typically advised to seek relief through mutual legal assistance channels.  This is so due to certain factors, including the victim's foreign domicile, the extraterritorial location of the fraud, and investigative difficulties inherent in international cases.

Nevertheless, based on our practical experience, if a preliminary investigation by Chinese authorities confirms the existence of fraud – and recognizing both the clear entitlement of the victim and the procedural complexities faced by foreign complainants – they may issue an informal statement of case facts or similar document recommending that the receiving bank refund the defrauded funds.  In such circumstances, once the receiving bank acknowledges the underlying fraud, its legal risk is minimal in honoring the authorities' directives and remitting the funds back via the original payment route, and banks are generally willing to comply.

II.   When defrauded funds have been credited to an NRA account but not yet dissipated

In cross-border fund transfers, once the receiving bank has credited the beneficiary's account, the beneficiary immediately acquires a deposit claim against the receiving bank.  At this stage, absent the beneficiary's consent or a formal court order, the receiving bank normally is reluctant to unilaterally reverse the transfer.  Victims in these instances can consider the following means of recovery.

1.   Apply to local authorities for an emergency payment suspension

The mechanism of "emergency payment suspension" derives from the Notice on Establishing an Emergency Payment Suspension and Rapid Freezing Mechanism for Accounts Involved in New Types of Telecom Network Fraud (hereinafter referred to as the "Notice on Emergency Payment Suspension").  Under this framework, a bank must suspend the payment functions of any account suspected of being used for telecom fraud upon receipt of an instruction from a public security authority and after it verifies the relevant information.

A victim may request an emergency payment suspension either by calling a police hotline or by reporting directly to the bank.  There is no requirement that the public security authority file a formal case beforehand.  The public security authority will transmit an electronically signed emergency payment suspension order to the head office of the bank where the account to be suspended is held.  The bank, through its internal transaction-processing system, will immediately verify the account name, account number, remittance amount, and transaction timestamps against the information contained in the order.  If these details are consistent, the bank must suspend all debit and credit operations on the targeted account without delay and may then conduct its own inquiry into the account holder.  Each suspension remains in place for 48 hours from the moment of activation, and may be applied up to two times in total.  In practice, the process can be completed swiftly from the moment the victim reports the fraud to the undertaking of suspension measures.

During the 48-hour suspension window, the public security authority examines the veracity of the victim's report.  If the report is confirmed as genuine and approved by the responsible public security official, a criminal case is formally filed.  Thereafter, via the internal supervisory platform, the public security authority issues a "Notice of Assistance to Freeze Assets" to the head office of the bank holding the suspended account.  Upon receipt of this notice, the bank is required to freeze the account.  Even after emergency suspension has been implemented, the receiving bank may launch its own due diligence investigation into the beneficiary.  Until the beneficiary cooperates to clarify the legitimacy of the transactions, all operations on the account remain suspended.  Knowing that the account has been frozen and is under investigation, fraudsters often abandon further transactions from that account.  Although an emergency stop does not in itself compel a refund, it serves to preserve any remaining funds and prevents their further dissipation.

2.   Seek a refund from the receiving bank

As noted above, at this stage victims can still seek a statement of case facts or similar document from the authorities; however, once the funds have been credited, it becomes highly uncertain as to both the willingness of the authorities to issue such an informal instruction and the receiving bank's readiness to act on it.  Because the credited funds constitute the account holder's property interests, neither the public security bureau nor the receiving bank may unilaterally debit the account and effect a refund without the depositor's consent or a binding judicial or regulatory order.

3.   International criminal judicial assistance

Recovery is substantially more difficult at this stage than before the funds have been credited.  However, unlike the phase in which the funds have already been dissipated, here the advantage lies in that the money remains in the primary fraud-related account.  At this stage, the victim may still petition for international criminal judicial assistance to request cooperation from Chinese authorities in repatriating the funds.

Based on China's legal framework and practical experience, three pathways exist for Chinese authorities to initiate recovery in cross-border telecom fraud cases.

• INTERPOL channels.  INTERPOL National Central Bureau of China (under the International Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security) → Provincial Public Security Authorities → Local/Municipal Public Security Authorities.

• Diplomatic channels.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs → Ministry of Public Security → Provincial Public Security Authorities → Local/Municipal Public Security Authorities.

• Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.  Judicial Ministry's International Cooperation Bureau → Ministry of Public Security → Provincial Public Security Authorities → Local/Municipal Public Security Authorities.

Because all three pathways involve multiple agencies and levels of approval, they are often time-consuming in practice and there is significant uncertainty as to whether the local authorities will ultimately accept the case and provide assistance.

4.   File an unjust-enrichment claim against the recipient

Victims may consider initiating a civil action and preservation of funds in China concurrent with or in lieu of other measures.  This is so because of the uncertainties inherent in the means of recovery at this stage – an emergency payment suspension may be lifted, international criminal judicial assistance can be protracted, and that the victim cannot be certain of continued restrictions on the beneficiary account.

While, as noted above, in telecom-fraud cases, Chinese courts typically give precedent to criminal over civil cases and may decline to accept a civil case on this basis.  Accordingly, when drafting the case statement and articulating the causes of action, the victim must take great care to present the facts and legal grounds in a manner that avoids the court classifying the suit as a de facto criminal proceeding and rejecting it at filing.  It is worth noting, however, that Chinese courts generally do not conduct a substantive review of the merits during the initial case-acceptance and preservation-order stages, focusing instead on formal admissibility.

III.   Defrauded funds have been dissipated

In cross-border telecom fraud, fund transfers typically occur quickly.  A more probable scenario in practice is that victims realize they have been defrauded only after the funds have already been dissipated.  At this stage, the following measures may be considered:

1.   Apply for extended payment suspension

Pursuant to the Notice on Emergency Payment Suspension, if the funds have already been transferred out of the initially suspended account, the bank must relay the transfer details to the public security authority.  The authority will then decide whether to extend the suspension to any downstream recipient accounts (i.e., secondary or lower-tier), a process known as an "extended suspension".  If the authority elects to proceed, it will issue an Extended Emergency Payment Suspension Notice to the relevant banks or payment service providers, instructing them to freeze the incoming funds.  Each extended suspension remains in force for 48 hours.  Where defrauded funds traverse multiple layers of accounts, extensions may be applied at each layer without statutory limitation on the number of tiers.

In 2021, China's Ministry of Public Security Criminal Investigation Bureau promulgated the Revised Provisions for Public Security Authorities' Payment Suspension, Inquiry, and Freeze in Telecom Network Fraud Cases.  Under these provisions, the authority to review and execute payment suspension orders was delegated to the public security organ at the same administrative level as the unit receiving the initial report, significantly accelerating the review and execution process.  The Revised Provisions also introduced an automatic tracing and extended suspension mechanism: when a bank provides complete transfer information, an extended suspension is triggered automatically.  This enhancement streamlines previous workflow in the Notice on Emergency Payment Suspension, "fund transfer → feedback to public security bureau → bureau decision → extended suspension", and turns it into a faster, more automated procedure.

2.   Claim tort liability compensation from the receiving bank

Whether the receiving bank bears tort liability depends on whether it was negligent in handling the remittance or its ancillary services, the principal form of such fault being a breach of the laws and regulations governing financial conduct.  Crucially, the basis for such liability arises from separate factual grounds unrelated to the telecom fraud itself (e.g., procedural violations in account opening or fund settlement) – each constitutes a separate legal fact – and the former does not depend on the outcome of the latter.  Thus, a Chinese court should not refuse to hear a tort action against the receiving bank based on the "criminal proceedings precede civil" principle.

To determine whether the receiving bank violated applicable regulatory requirements, the inquiry focuses principally on two aspects of its operations: the account‐opening process and the fund settlement (payment‐execution) process.

• Account opening phase.  The bank must verify the account holder's identity through multiple channels, rigorously review the authenticity, completeness, and compliance of corporate account documentation, and implement know your client (KYC) principles to ensure clients' eligibility, identity authenticity, and information accuracy.

• Fund settlement phase.  The bank must fulfill its KYC and due diligence obligations.  This includes identifying the transaction's background, nature, purpose, compliance and consistency with declared foreign exchange activities; verifying alignment between transaction documents and cross-border fund flows; fulfilling obligations to report large or suspicious transactions; and filing suspicious transaction reports for anomalies exceeding thresholds.

In conclusion, successfully holding the receiving bank liable hinges on case-specific factual and legal analyses, requiring detailed scrutiny.  In cross-border transactions, Chinese domestic banks are regulated by multiple authorities, including the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and the National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA).  Relevant regulatory provisions are also extensive and fragmented, including but not limited to:

• Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law of the People's Republic of China

• Anti-Money Laundering Law of the People's Republic of China

• Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration

• Circular of the People's Bank of China on Matters relating to Strengthening the Management of Payment and Settlement to Prevent New-type Telecommunication Network Crimes

• Circular of the People's Bank of China on Matters Concerning Further Enhancing Administration of Payments and Settlement to Guard Against New-type Telecommunication and Online Illegal and Criminal Activities

• Circular of the People's Bank of China on Strengthening Account-opening Management and the Follow-up Control Measures after Suspicious Transaction Reporting

• Circular of the People's Bank of China and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issuing the Guidelines for Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorism Financing of the Cross-border Business of Banks (for Trial Implementation)

• Circular of the People's Bank of China on Strengthening Client Identification for Anti-money Laundering

• Administrative Measures for the Reporting of Large-value and Suspicious Transactions by Financial Institutions

Under Chinese law, the statute of limitations for bringing a tort claim against a bank is three years, calculated from the date on which the injured party knows – or ought reasonably to have known – both the wrongful act and the identity of the tortfeasor.  Victims of telecom fraud are often unaware of any bank misconduct until they undertake further investigation – whether by filing a criminal report or obtaining a lawyer's investigative order – so initiating a civil claim as soon as evidence of the bank's regulatory or tortious breach comes to light will almost always fall within the permissible time frame.

Recovery with assistance from regulatory authorities

During the process of recovering cross-border telecom fraud proceeds, close collaboration with regulatory authorities can compel these agencies to discharge their supervisory responsibilities and expedite oversight of banks and other financial institutions, thereby encouraging banks to cooperate in repatriating victims' funds.  In 2015, the State Council established an inter-ministerial joint conference mechanism to combat and address new telecom network crimes.  This mechanism comprises twenty-three departments and entities, including the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the PBOC, the former China Banking Regulatory Commission (now the NFRA), China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile.  In the context of cross-border telecom fraud, this mechanism plays a strategic role in coordinating efforts and pooling resources.  The principal financial regulators involved are the PBOC, the SAFE, and the NFRA.

Because fraudsters in these schemes often exploit loopholes in the banking system, victims should proactively seek support from financial regulators.  At an early stage, victims frequently face an impasse: banks decline to disclose detailed fund flow information on the grounds of "client confidentiality" and public security authorities defer formal case filing due to jurisdictional complexities.  At this juncture, victims should approach the PBOC or the SAFE – either orally or in writing – and present a clear summary of the facts and request that the regulator initiate an investigation into the suspected fraud.

If repeated verbal and written inquiries fail to elicit a substantive response, the victim may submit a formal complaint or dispatch a legal demand letter, highlighting alleged violations of the remitting bank in the NRA account opening or fund disbursement processes.  Upon receiving such a complaint or letter, the regulator will likely request preliminary evidence that the bank breached its customer due-diligence or anti-money laundering (AML) obligations.  The victim need only supply sufficient information to substantiate the bank's potential noncompliance and identify the specific regulatory lapses.

For instance, the receiving bank may have violated relevant anti-money laundering laws if the ultimate controller of an NRA account is solely a Chinese national and the bank failed to fulfill its KYC obligations when opening the NRA account, conducting only a perfunctory review of the identity of the shell company's ultimate controller; or if in cross-border trade transactions, the bank neglected to scrutinize forged trade documents, thereby failing to verify the authenticity, consistency, and legality of the transactions; or if the bank did not file a Suspicious Transaction Report for abnormally large foreign exchange settlement transactions.

If the regulatory authorities are persuaded to launch an internal inquiry, the findings can not only trace the subsequent flow of the defrauded funds but also uncover the bank's unlawful or noncompliant behavior during stages such as account opening and transaction monitoring.  These findings can serve as crucial evidence in subsequent civil litigation to hold the bank liable for torts.  Moreover, if the funds have not yet been settled, the regulatory scrutiny and intervention exerts considerable pressure on the bank: to avoid administrative sanctions – such as fines or suspension of its foreign‐exchange business license – for failing to fulfill its foreign exchange authenticity verification duties, the bank may be incentivized to negotiate a voluntary repayment with the victim.

Legal instruments for cross‐border fund recovery

In recovering defrauded funds, as noted above, the most common scenario is that by the time a victim discovers the fraud, the funds have already been dissipated.  The victim may nonetheless initiate a civil action against the responsible bank without being constrained by the "criminal proceedings precede civil" principle.  Within such civil proceedings, the following legal tools can synergized with other remedial measures to improve the prospects of recovery.

I.   Property preservation

China's property preservation mechanism functions similarly to the freezing order or Mareva injunction in common-law jurisdictions.  It comprises three stages – pre-litigation preservation, litigation preservation, and pre-enforcement preservation – creating a layered mechanism to prevent debtors from dissipating assets during litigation or enforcement. 

Pre-litigation preservation allows a party to freeze the opposing party's assets prior to filing suit or arbitration, provided it posts security equal to 100% of the requested preservation amount (e.g., in cash or via a bank/insurance guarantee).  The court must rule on this application within 48 hours.  Litigation preservation is applicable when a case is accepted and remains pending until judgment, a party may request preservation by posting security, which is typically 30% of the preservation amount.  In practice, pre-litigation and litigation preservation processes have largely merged.  Plaintiffs commonly submit preservation applications together with their case-filing materials; The case-filing and trial divisions of courts then coordinate internally to accept the case and render a decision within five days, after which the enforcement division executes the preservation order ex parte, without prior notice to the respondent (e.g., seizure, freezing, or attachment of assets).  Consequently, a notable procedural hurdle for international victims is the requirement to notarize and authenticate their identity and authorization documents when initiating litigation in China, which may delay the opportunity to secure timely preservation orders.

The evidentiary threshold for asset preservation is lower than that of a freezing order under common law.  The applicant need not prove a prima facie case in full but must show that exigent circumstances exist, and that failure to preserve assets immediately would cause irreparable harm to their legitimate interests.  Acceptable forms of security include cash deposits or litigation liability insurance policies, with premiums typically ranging from 0.04% to 0.08% of the preservation amount.  Insurers will generally assess the facts of the case, legal risk, and evidentiary sufficiency before underwriting such policies.

In cross-border telecom fraud cases, victims may apply for preservation orders to freeze assets under the control of the fraudster, including secondary or downstream accounts not yet subject to extension payment suspension by police.  This requires that the victim first identify the downstream accounts controlled by the fraudster – an effort that typically involves tools such as a lawyer's investigation order.

II.   Investigation orders

Investigation orders in China serve a role similar to that of several common law disclosure tools, including disclosure orders, Norwich Pharmacal orders, and Bankers Trust orders.  These orders are designed to assist victims in tracing the flow of defrauded funds to recovery.  However, unlike their common law counterparts, which impose disclosure obligations on respondents or third-party banks by court order, the Chinese system is more victim-initiated: the court grants the victim's lawyer authority to conduct an investigation, but the onus is on the lawyer to collect the necessary evidence by directly engaging with the relevant institutions.  This tool is not yet enshrined in national legislation but is authorized by judicial regulations issued at the provincial or municipal level.

In cross-border telecom fraud cases, investigation orders are primarily used to trace the destination of the defrauded funds.  Unlike a Bankers Trust order, which requires the bank to proactively search for related accounts, the victim must provide the court with the specific bank account numbers and the names of the banks to be investigated.  Victims typically know at least the details of the primary account.  By analyzing the transaction history of that primary account, the victim can progressively identify secondary, tertiary, and lower-tier accounts, and then apply for successive investigation orders to uncover the flow of funds.  Based on these findings, the victim can apply for property preservation measures or pursue compensation directly against the holders of the implicated accounts.

Conclusion

Cross-border recovery of telecom fraud funds is an inherently complex, system-wide endeavor that demands multidimensional coordination of legal procedures, collaboration with financial regulatory authorities, and strategic application of legal instruments.  From the perspective of the fund flow, every link in the chain offers potential avenues for legal recourse – from the remitting bank to intermediary banks, to the receiving bank, and ultimately to downstream domestic accounts.  Successful recovery hinges on deploying precise strategies at each stage of the fund flow, coupled with proactive regulatory involvement.  Victims must operate within the legal framework, leverage a tailored combination of tools, and utilize communication channels with public security authorities and financial regulators to surmount obstacles and reclaim their losses.

Finally, it is worth noting that defrauded funds from telecom-fraud schemes from many years past may still lie dormant in onshore accounts or internal ledgers due to China's foreign exchange controls, banks' internal compliance with anti-fraud and anti-money laundering measures, and the operational restrictions domestic banks may place on beneficiary accounts.  Even if victims previously abandoned their recovery efforts due to procedural or practical obstacles, they may retain the right to the means of recovery described above to reclaim those funds.