Authors: Ting ZHENG丨Eryin YING丨Shirley LIANG丨Ruonan WANG丨Hattie ZHANG
Overview
In 2026, China issued three (3) State Council instruments: the Provisions of the State Council on the Security of Industrial and Supply Chains ("Order 834",《国务院关于产业链供应链安全的规定》), the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign States ("Order 835",《中华人民共和国反外国不当域外管辖条例》), and the Provisions of the State Council on Outbound Investment ("Order 837",《国务院关于对外投资的规定》). They operate alongside the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China ("AFSL",《中华人民共和国反外国制裁法》) and the Rules on Blocking Improper Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures (《阻断外国法律与措施不当域外适用办法》).
This article focuses on a common thread running through the three (3) State Council instruments: provisions that respond to discriminatory prohibitions, restrictions or other similar measures taken by foreign states, regions or international organisations against China, and provisions that prohibit organisations and individuals in China from implementing, or assisting in implementing, such measures.
For a foreign-invested bank in China, these provisions may apply in two ways. First, the bank itself may be directly subject to them: as an organisation in China for the purposes of the information-gathering rules and the duty to comply with Chinese measures; or as an entity actually controlled by, or established or operated with the participation of, a foreign party against whom measures have been taken, so that those measures extend to its China subsidiary or branch. Second, the bank may be affected indirectly where its customers or counterparties are the subject of a foreign discriminatory measure or of a Chinese investigation or countermeasure. In that case the bank's financing, payment, clearing, information-sharing and contractual arrangements may need to be adjusted, and the bank may itself face claims by the affected Chinese entity. This article builds upon these implications of the three (3) State Council instruments, and also discuss recent judicial practices and practical guidance for foreign-invested banks.
Key Provisions of the Three (3) Instruments
I. Order 834: Securing industrial and supply chains
Order 834 establishes mechanisms to safeguard industrial and supply chains in key sectors, including risk monitoring and early warning, risk prevention and emergency response. Articles 13 through 16 are most relevant to foreign-invested banks which are detailed article by article as follows.
1. Article 13 – industrial and supply chain related information gathering and sharing
Article 13 of Order 834 provides that any organisation or individual that conducts investigations or other supply chain-related information gathering in China in violation of Chinese laws, administrative regulations, departmental rules or other applicable national requirements may be subject to measures taken by the relevant authorities.
Article 13 does not prohibit ordinary banking activities. A foreign-invested bank may continue to conduct routine credit investigations, industry analysis, KYC and trade-based due diligence, and share relevant customer or supply chain information with its overseas group for legitimate group credit and risk management purposes, provided that such activities comply with applicable Chinese requirements, including those relating to data protection, confidentiality and trade secrets.
The key consideration is the purpose and context of the information collection and disclosure. In particular, a bank should not collect information in China in response to a discriminatory measure imposed by a foreign authority and subsequently provide it to that authority, whether directly or indirectly through an overseas group entity, auditor or service provider. Such conduct may constitute assistance in implementing conduct that endangers China's industrial and supply chain security under Article 14 of Order 834, or assistance in implementing an improper extraterritorial measure under Article 6 of Order 835.
In practice, overseas group entities, customers and auditors may request information from Chinese entities in connection with foreign laws and regulatory investigations, such as the US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (《美国维吾尔强迫劳动预防法案》), the EU Forced Labour Regulation (《欧盟禁止强迫劳动产品条例》), the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (《欧盟企业可持续尽职调查指令》) and Germany's Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (《德国供应链尽职调查法》). Order 834 does not require banks to reject all such requests. Instead, banks should adopt a proportionate, risk-based review, focusing on the information requested, its intended purpose, the recipients and any onward disclosure. To be more specific, requests involving comprehensive customer or supplier lists, critical mineral sources, multi-tier supply chain tracing, site-specific production capacity, core technical parameters, extensive employee records or on-site interviews warrant enhanced scrutiny by banks. Banks should identify the specific foreign legal or regulatory requirement, the ultimate recipient (e.g. US Customs and Border Protection, an EU investigating authority or a foreign court) and the intended use of the information. They should also check whether the relevant foreign measure has been identified by Chinese authorities as an improper extraterritorial measure or a trade-related investment barrier, or has otherwise triggered Chinese countermeasures. For example, a decision announced by the Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM") effective on 5 August 2026 prohibits organisations and individuals in China from engaging in specified transactions or cooperation with six named US entities, including Responsible Business Alliance and Altana Technologies, Inc., in which case foreign-invested banks must not collect any information in China and share with these named entities, whether directly or indirectly. Routing a request through an overseas parent, customer or auditor does not avoid these requirements.
2. Articles 14 and 15 – acting upon discriminatory measures that endanger the security of industrial and supply chains of China
Article 14 is directed in the first place at foreign states, regions and international organisations that adopt discriminatory prohibitions, restrictions or similar measures against China in relation to industrial and supply chains. But it also reaches any entity or individual that implements or assists in implementing conduct that harms China's industrial and supply chain security, and the authorities may prohibit or restrict imports or exports of relevant goods or technologies, or international trade in services by such entity or individual, or impose special charges on such entity or individual, or place such entity or individual on a countermeasures list under the AFSL.
Article 15 goes further to require any foreign entity or individual to avoid acting contrary to normal market trading principles by interrupting normal transactions with a Chinese entity, or by taking discriminatory measures against a Chinese customer or counterparty, on the basis of a foreign sanctions or export control requirement. Where such conduct causes substantial harm, or a threat of substantial harm, to China's industrial and supply chain security, the authorities may investigate and impose on the relevant foreign entity or individual the measures listed in Article 15, including prohibitions or restrictions on imports and exports involving China, investment in China, transactions and cooperation with parties in China, entry of relevant persons and means of transport, and the eligibility of relevant persons to work, stay or reside in China. Those measures may extend to any entity actually controlled, established or operated by such foreign entity or individual.
For a foreign-invested bank in China, the risk is therefore not limited to a decision to refuse a transaction, but also the collection and onward transmission of supply chain information, or the freezing of payments may all be characterised as assistance, whether such action is carried out by the bank itself or its parent bank. Additionally, banks can be sued for the losses the affected Chinese entities suffered due to banks' "assistance" in implementing the relevant discriminatory measures.
In practice, two cases illustrate that this exposure is practical rather than theoretical. Haiyue Energy Group Co., Ltd. (海越能源), a state-controlled former A-share listed company, has brought separate property damage claims against two US based banks (US Bank A and US Bank B). According to its public announcements, under a June 2023 heavy oil purchase contract with a Hong Kong counterparty it remitted US$27 million through US Bank A and approximately US$13.467 million through US Bank B in July 2023, but the funds never reached the payee. On 31 May 2024 the two banks disclosed by SWIFT message that the funds had been "released" to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") or had been frozen on its instructions. Haiyue Energy contends that OFAC's unilateral sanctions against a Chinese entity are discriminatory restrictive measures, that the banks assisted in implementing them by freezing and transferring its assets, and that this infringed its property rights; it also points out that OFAC designated the payee only on 2 February 2024, several months after the payments were made. The Shanghai Financial Court accepted the claim against US Bank A on 11 February 2026 and the Beijing Financial Court accepted the claim against US Bank B on 5 March 2026. The claims seek the return of US$40.467 million plus interest. Neither case has yet been decided. The significance for foreign-invested banks lies in the acceptance of the cases rather than in their outcome: a Chinese entity is prepared to sue foreign banks in a Chinese court for losses caused by compliance with foreign sanctions, and the courts have been willing to entertain such claims.
3. Article 16 — the duty to comply with Chinese measures
Once measures are adopted under Articles 14 and 15, entities and individuals in China must comply with them. For a foreign-invested bank this means that where a customer, counterparty or group entity becomes subject to a Chinese measure, the bank's China operations must give effect to the relevant prohibition or restriction, including restrictions on transactions and cooperation. A failure to do so may result in an order to rectify and in restrictions on government procurement and tendering, imports and exports and international trade in services, cross-border receipt or provision of data and personal information, and, where applicable, an individual's departure from China or stay or residence in China. Article 16 therefore converts a measure directed at a third party into a direct compliance obligation for the bank, and it should be built into screening and escalation procedures rather than handled case by case.
II. Order 835: Identifying and responding to improper foreign extraterritorial measures
Order 835 (published and effective on 7 April 2026) is the first State Council-level regulation specifically addressing improper extraterritorial jurisdiction by foreign states; it elevates the earlier departmental-rule-level blocking framework into a State Council-level "from blocking to countermeasures" regime. After its taking effect, on 19 August 2026 the Ministry of Justice ("MOJ") issued Announcement No. 8[1], made under Articles 3 and 6 of Order 835 following an identification exercise conducted with MOFCOM and other authorities. It determined that the EU's use of its Foreign Subsidies Regulation to adopt cross-border investigative practices against Chinese entities in its investigation into JD.com constitutes an improper extraterritorial jurisdiction measure, and stated that any entity or individual shall not implement or assist in implementing that measure. The announcement took effect on publication. In the accompanying press Q&A[2], MOJ's spokesperson said that the EU had demanded extensive and unnecessary information located in China from Chinese entities on a cross-border basis, that this imposed improper requirements on those entities and seriously undermined the international rule of law, and that China would lawfully respond with countermeasures if the EU did not correct its practice.
For a fuller discussion of the framework and its implications for foreign-invested banks, we suggest readers read our earlier newsletter, "China's Rules on Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Key Provisions and Implications for Foreign-Invested Banks".
III. Order 837: Outbound investment transactions
Order 837 took effect on 1 July 2026 and applies to outbound investment by investors in China. Articles 24 and 25 of Order 837 address discriminatory measures affecting Chinese investors and their outbound investments, as well as the measures the Chinese authorities may take in response.
1. Article 24 — discriminatory measures against China in investment and business activities
This provision corresponds to Article 14 of Order 834: it is directed at foreign states, regions and international organisations that, in violation of international law and the basic norms of international relations, adopt discriminatory prohibitions, restrictions or similar measures against China in relation to investment or business activities, and at entities and individuals directly or indirectly involved in formulating, deciding or implementing them. The analysis of Article 14 in Section 1 above — including the "assistance" route, the countermeasures list and the extension of measures to entities actually controlled by, or established or operated with the participation of, a listed party — applies equally here.
2. Article 25 — interruption of normal transactions and discriminatory measures against investors
Article 25 substantially mirrors Article 15 of Order 834, with the additional element of unreasonably depriving or restricting the legitimate rights and interests of investors and their outbound investments. A foreign bank that, contrary to normal market trading principles, interrupts normal transactions with a Chinese borrower or investee, or takes discriminatory measures against an investor or its overseas investment — for example by freezing a payment, refusing to continue a facility or declining clearing on the basis of a foreign sanctions requirement — may be exposed to the measures listed in Article 25, which may extend to the bank's China subsidiary or branch. The affected Chinese party may also seek damages under Article 12 of the AFSL and Article 14 of Order 835. The discussion of Article 15 and the Haiyue Energy proceedings in Section 1 above is therefore equally relevant here.
Recent Judicial Practice and Implications for Foreign-Invested Banks
I. Hikvision shipping dispute case: concerns about foreign restrictions did not excuse non-performance
A maritime case published by the Supreme People's Court on 24 June 2026[3]arose from a dispute between Hikvision International Co., Limited ("Hikvision Hong Kong"), Ocean Network Express Pte. Ltd. ("ONE Singapore") and Ocean Network Express (China) Ltd. Hikvision Hong Kong is a Hong Kong subsidiary of Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd. ("Hikvision Hangzhou"), which was placed on the Entity List maintained by the US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security.
In October 2022, Hikvision Hong Kong booked a shipment of electronic products from Shanghai to Panama with ONE Singapore. After receiving and shipping the goods, the carrier declined to issue bills of lading and deliver the goods, citing foreign sanctions and export control concerns. It later returned the goods to Shanghai without Hikvision Hong Kong's consent. Publicly available case commentary indicates that the bills of lading contained a Singapore governing law clause[4]. Hikvision Hong Kong brought a claim for its losses before the Shanghai Maritime Court.
The court held that the carrier's refusal to perform and unilateral return of the goods constituted a fundamental breach. Applying Article 4 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Law to Foreign-Related Civil Relations (《中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法》), it directly applied Article 12 of the AFSL notwithstanding the contractual choice of Singapore law. The court found that the carrier's concern about being affected by foreign restrictions did not justify its non-performance, and the general exemption clause in the bill of lading shall not bind the contractual parties as that clause is a standard term unilaterally provided by the carrier which had not been specifically negotiated, and had not been reasonably brought to the shipper's attention. The court therefore held the carrier liable for fundamental breach and awarded the Hikvision Hong Kong its losses and interest[5].
The key takeaway from the above case is that a contractual choice of foreign law cannot exclude applicable mandatory provisions of the AFSL, therefore a suffered Chinese entity will always reserve the right to claim for losses based on Article 12 of the AFSL, even though whether or not a fully negotiated liability exemption clause can help discharge the relevant liability is not tested in this case. From foreign-invested banks' perspective, for prudent purpose, before declining a payment, terminating financing or restricting a customer's transactions, banks should always assess whether the actions could be deemed taken based on any discriminatory measures, regardless of the contractual choice of governing law and liability exemption clauses in the relevant contract, to avoid the potential risk of compensation for fundamental breach of contract.
II. Nanjing Maritime Court case: an arbitration clause may not prevent a negotiated resolution in court
In case (2024) Su 72 Min Chu No. 2157[6], a European marine equipment company stopped paying the balance owed to a Chinese offshore engineering company, citing sanctions imposed by a third country. The Chinese company obtained a pre-action order to arrest a vessel owned by such European marine equipment company and, on 11 October 2024, brought a tort claim under Article 12 of the AFSL before the Nanjing Maritime Court. After the court accepted the case, the European company applied to the third country for a payment licence and provided security to release the vessel. It also voluntarily gave up the agreed overseas arbitration. The parties subsequently reached an agreement through court mediation, and the court issued a civil mediation statement on 19 November 2024.
The key takeaway is that, while the case should not be interpreted as establishing that Article 12 of the AFSL automatically overrides an arbitration agreement between contracting parties or confers jurisdiction on PRC courts notwithstanding an otherwise valid agreement to arbitrate disputes offshore, it nevertheless demonstrates that Article 12 may provide Chinese entities adversely affected by the implementation of foreign sanctions with an additional and potentially effective avenue for seeking judicial relief. In particular, the case illustrates the potential leverage of initiating tort proceedings in PRC courts, together with applying for pre-litigation interim measures (such as the arrest or preservation of assets in China), to put substantial commercial pressure on the foreign counterparty. In the case, the Chinese claimant successfully obtained a pre-litigation arrest order against the vessel in question before commencing proceedings under Article 12. Faced with the commercial consequences of the vessel's continued detention and the prospect of potential tort liability under PRC law, the foreign counterparty ultimately abandoned the offshore arbitration proceedings and agreed to resolve the dispute through mediation before the PRC court.
Important Announcement |
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This Legal Commentary has been prepared for clients and professional associates of Han Kun Law Offices. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, no responsibility can be accepted for errors and omissions, however caused. The information contained in this publication should not be relied on as legal advice and should not be regarded as a substitute for detailed advice in individual cases. If you have any questions regarding this publication, please contact: |
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Ting ZHENG Tel: +86 21 6080 0203 Email: ting.zheng@hankunlaw.com |
[1]https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/gwxw/xwyw/202608/t20260819_538689.html.
[2]https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/gwxw/xwyw/202608/t20260819_538687.html.
[3]Please refer to: https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun/xiangqing/503641.html.
[4]Please refer to: https://www.ccpitjs.org/art/2026/10/9/art_2661_82691.html.
[6]Please refer to: https://www.njhsfy.gov.cn/zh/news/detail/id/10073.html.